Robust scoring rules by Tsakas, Elias
  
 
Robust scoring rules
Citation for published version (APA):
Tsakas, E. (2018). Robust scoring rules. (GSBE Research Memoranda; No. 023). GSBE.
Document status and date:
Published: 08/10/2018
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 Elias Tsakas 
 
 
Robust scoring rules 
 
 
RM/18/023 
 
Robust scoring rules∗
Elias Tsakas†
Maastricht University
First Draft: July 2017
This draft: October, 2018
Abstract
We study elicitation of latent (prior) beliefs when the agent can acquire information via a costly
attention strategy. We introduce a mechanism that simultaneously makes it strictly dominant
to (a) not acquire any information, and (b) report truthfully. We call such a mechanism a robust
scoring rule. Robust scoring rules are important for different reasons. Theoretically, they are
crucial both for establishing that decision-theoretic models under uncertainty are testable. From
an applied point of view, they are needed for eliciting unbiased estimates of population beliefs.
We prove that a robust scoring rule exists under mild axioms on the attention costs. These
axioms are shown to characterize the class of posterior-separable cost functions. Our existence
proof is constructive, thus identifying an entire class of robust scoring rules. Subsequently, we
show that we can arbitrarily approximate the agent’s prior beliefs with a quadratic scoring rule.
The same holds true for a discrete scoring rule. Finally, we show that the prior beliefs can be
approximated, even when we are uncertain about the exact specification of the agent’s attention
costs.
Keywords: Belief elicitation, prior beliefs, rational inattention, hidden information costs,
posterior-separability, Shannon entropy, population beliefs, testing decision-theoretic models.
JEL Codes: C91, D81, D82, D83, D87.
1. Introduction
Subjective beliefs constitute one of the most common latent variables of interest in economics (e.g.,
Manski, 2004). Having recognized this, statisticians and economists have developed mechanisms,
called (proper) scoring rules, that incentivize the economic agent to reveal his true latent belief,
irrespective of which this belief is. Due to their solid theoretical foundations (i.e., the fact that they
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John Rehbeck, Burkhard Schipper and Peter Wakker for their valuable comments at different stages of this project. I
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are incentive-compatible), proper scoring rules have been extensively used both in the lab and the
field, as well as in various applications.
One of the main concerns with scoring rules is that (the incentives provided by) the mechanism
itself may affect the very same beliefs it tries to elicit. As Schotter and Trevino (2014, p.109)
eloquently put it,
“the very act of belief elicitation may change the beliefs of subjects from their true latent
beliefs or the beliefs they would hold (respond to) if those beliefs were not elicited (we
might have a type of Heisenberg problem)”.
This problem is particularly important both from a theoretical and an applied point of view.
For starters, we naturally ask whether it is even theoretically possible to construct non-invasive
incentible-compatible mechanisms for belief elicitation. Specifically in the context of choice under
uncertainty, a negative answer would immediately raise foundational questions about the testability
of theories that use subjective beliefs as an explanatory variable of behavior. Consequently, we
would not be able to identify the decision rule used by the individual who chooses under uncertainty
(Manski, 2004). Take, for instance, subjective expected utility as the benchmark model and ask
whether the observed choices can be rationalized by this model. Obviously, in order to answer this
question, we need to be able to measure the individual’s subjective beliefs at the moment of his
decision, and in order to do so we need a mechanism that does not affect these beliefs. We further
elaborate in Section 6.1.
Second, from an applied point of view, non-invasive belief elicitation mechanisms are particularly
useful for surveys whose aim is to elicit the distribution of beliefs in a population. For instance,
consider a marketing campaign interested in eliciting the average subjective belief in a population of
consumers (e.g., about a new product being superior to the existing ones), or a political campaign
interested in the median belief in a population of voters (e.g., about a proposed project being suc-
cessful). The common denominator in the previous two examples is that we are not interested in
learning the true state of nature per se, but rather in finding out what the population believes about
the state of nature. Thus, we draw a representative sample from the respective population, we elicit
individual beliefs from the sample, and we use the empirical frequency to estimate the distribution
of the population beliefs. Crucially, we want the individuals in the sample to report the beliefs they
would have held, had the survey not taken place. Otherwise, our estimate of the population beliefs
will be biased. We further elaborate on this type of incentivized surveys in Section 6.2.
Overall, the aim of this paper is to construct scoring rules that elicit the individual’s prior beliefs
(viz., the ones he would have held in the absence of our elicitation procedure), rather than some
updated beliefs that he may form after paying extra attention to the problem in an attempt to
exploit the incentives provided by the scoring rule.
We consider scoring rules in a model with hidden information costs, which typically emerge as an
expression of rationally inattentive preferences a` la Sims (2003) (for an overview, see Caplin, 2016).
In our formal model, there is a (male) agent – henceforth called the subject – who has a latent (prior)
probabilistic belief for some fixed event.1 A (female) agent – henceforth called the experimenter –
wants to elicit this belief, and to this end she asks the agent to report it. In order to incentivize him
to report truthfully, she designs a scoring rule that rewards the subject on the basis of his report and
the realization of the event. Before stating his report, the agent can acquire information through
a costly attention strategy and then reports his belief after having perhaps updated his prior (see
Figure 1 for the timeline).
1Throughout the paper – being aligned with the rational inattention literature – the term “prior belief” refers to
the belief held by the subject in the absence of elicitation.
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Figure 1: Boxes above the line are observed symmetrically by the subject and the experimenter. Boxes
below the line are only observed by the subject. The shaded box is observed with a delay, i.e., it is realized
at t = 1 and observed at t = 5.
In order to elicit the subject’s prior belief, the scoring rule must make it simultaneously (a) strictly
dominant not to acquire any information (i.e., to choose the degenerate zero-attention strategy), and
(b) strictly dominant to report truthfully (i.e., the scoring rule is proper). Such a mechanism is called
robust scoring rule. Two natural questions arise then. Does a robust scoring rule exist? And if yes,
how does it look like? Note that, in expectation, every attention strategy yields a benefit (due to
the fact that reporting is postponed till after the beliefs have been updated) and a cost (due to the
fact that information acquisition is costly). Thus, the experimenter’s problem boils down to finding
a scoring rule that provides sufficiently strong incentives for the agent to report truthfully, but not
so strong to offset the costs of acquiring information. In this sense our work can be seen as part of
a larger literature on the tradeoff between material payoffs and cognitive costs (Alaoui and Penta,
2018). The novelty of our work is that we try to exploit the presence of such costs.
Our main theorem shows that robust scoring rules exist under some mild axioms on the attention
costs (Theorem 1). First, as always assumed in the literature, we require that the only costless atten-
tion strategy is the one that carries no information. Second, we impose a dynamic consistency axiom,
which states roughly that it costs the same in expectation (to the subject) acquiring information at
once or step-by-step. It turns out that our axioms characterize a well-known class of cost functions
that has recently attracted attention in the literature, viz., the class of posterior-separable attention
costs. Posterior-separability has solid theoretical foundations (Caplin et al., 2017; Zhong, 2017) and
is supported by recent experimental evidence (Dean and Neligh, 2017). The proof of our theorem is
constructive. Notably, not only do we show existence, but we also explicitly identify an entire class
of robust scoring rules for each posterior-separable cost function. In this sense, our theory has strong
empirical content.
We subsequently weaken our notion of robustness, by attempting to elicit a belief sufficiently
close to the subject’s prior instead of the exact prior. In general, there are two forces that may bring
the report away from the prior beliefs, viz., updating to some posterior belief (at t = 3 in Figure
1) as a result of paying attention (at t = 2), and reporting a belief different than the posterior (at
t = 4) as a result of the scoring rule not being proper. Approximate robustness requires that, even
when combined, the two forces should not have a major effect. More precisely, a scoring rule is called
ε-robust if, for every prior belief, the two forces will certainly lead to a report not further than ε
away from the prior. Requiring merely approximate robustness allows us access to commonly-used
scoring rules which we would not have been able to use, had we required exact robustness instead.
In particular, we show that quite generally under our aforementioned axioms on the attention costs,
for any margin of error ε > 0, there exists an ε-robust quadratic scoring rule (Proposition 2) and an
ε-robust discrete scoring rule (Proposition 3). The previous results demonstrate that we do not need
to use some exotic scoring rule in order for our theory to have a bite; instead, we can rely on usual
scoring rules that are commonly-used in most applications and practical settings.
Resorting to approximate robustness has a second advantage, viz., it allows us to elicit beliefs
sufficiently close to the prior, even when we are uncertain of the subject’s attention costs. In par-
ticular, suppose that the experimenter does not have enough data to calibrate the subject’s actual
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cost structure, and instead she has formed a probabilistic estimate over the set of possible cost spec-
ifications. Let her accordingly assign probability p to the event that the subject’s attention costs
satisfy our axioms. Then, we show that for every ε > 0, there exists a scoring rule that elicits a belief
at most ε away from the prior with probability arbitrarily close to p (Theorem 2). This result is
important for practical purposes, and in particular for surveys that aim at eliciting distributions of
beliefs in a population. Indeed, typically in such settings, the experimenter has at best probabilistic
estimates of the underlying costs (for further discussion, see Section 6.2).
On top of the foundational questions that we address (regarding the testability of decision-
theoretic models under uncertainty), this paper contributes to two different streams of literature,
viz., belief elicitation via scoring rules and rational inattention. A quick non-exhaustive overview of
the main directions that have been explored so far in these two literatures is relegated to Section 7.
Of particular interest is the relationship between our paper and the one of Chambers and Lambert
(2017) in that they are among the handful of papers that study dynamic belief elicitation. To the
best of our knowledge, the only other paper is the one by Karni (2017).2 In their paper, Chambers
and Lambert (2017) consider an agent who has a latent prior belief and receives new information
over time based on an exogenously given dynamic process. Then, they construct a mechanism
which makes it incentive-compatible for the agent to simultaneously reveal his prior, his anticipated
information flow and his realized posteriors. The conceptual difference to our paper is that the agent
does not strategically choose the process of his information flow (viz., the attention strategy in our
terminology). Moreover, the two papers differ in the formal approaches that they employ, viz., as
opposed to our paper, their mechanism does not rely on the usual subgradient characterization, but
rather on a randomization technique originally introduced by Allais (1953). On the other hand, a
major similarity is that both our paper and the one of Chambers and Lambert (2017) truthfully
elicit the agent’s prior beliefs.
The other paper that is closely related to our work is the one by Clemen (2002), who also studies
the possible effect of scoring rules in information acquisition. However, unlike our paper, his aim is
not to preclude information acquisition, as scoring rules are primarily used as incentive schemes for
experts.
In Section 2 we introduce our basic framework. In Section 3 we present our axioms, we state our
main result and we study the special case with entropic attention attention costs. In Section 4 we
introduce approximate robustness, and we study approximately robust quadratic and discrete scoring
rules. In Section 5 we study approximately robust scoring rules in the presence of uncertainty about
attention cost. In Section 6 we further elaborate on our motivation. Section 7 contains a discussion.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
Proper scoring rules. Consider a binary state space Ω = {ω0, ω1}. A risk-neutral (male) exper-
imental subject has a latent subjective belief µ0 ∈ [0, 1] of ω0 occurring, which is not observed by
the (female) experimenter. The subject is asked to state µ0 and reports some r ∈ [0, 1], which is not
necessarily equal to µ0. A scoring rule is a function
S : [0, 1]× Ω→ R,
chosen by the experimenter, which takes the subject’s report (r) and the realized state (ω) as an
input and returns a monetary payoff (Sr(ω)) as an output. In economics we sometimes consider
2I am indebted to Chris Chambers for pointing out these connections.
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stochastic scoring rules where the subject is paid in probabilities of winning a fixed prize. Stochastic
scoring rules are used to elicit the subject’s belief for arbitrary risk attitudes. Our entire analysis is
directly extended to stochastic scoring rules (Section 7), implying that our assumption of the subject
being risk-neutral is without loss of generality and can therefore be dispensed with. In statistics on
the other hand the image of S is often allowed to take values in R = [−∞,∞], in order to deal
with a common subdifferentiability issue that often appears with ordinary scoring rules like the ones
described above. For a discussion on such scoring rules, see Section 7.
The subject is assumed to maximize Subjective Expected Utility, i.e., given the scoring rule (S)
and a belief (µ), he chooses the report (r) that maximizes
Eµ(Sr) := µSr(ω0) + (1− µ)Sr(ω1).
A scoring rule is called proper whenever it is strictly dominant for the subject to report his true
latent belief, irrespective of what this belief is. Formally, S is a proper scoring rule, whenever
Eµ(Sµ) > Eµ(Sr) (1)
for every r 6= µ and every µ ∈ [0, 1] (Brier, 1950; Good, 1952). The most commonly used proper
scoring rule is the quadratic, which is defined by Sr(ω0) := α − β(1 − r)2 and Sr(ω1) := α − βr2,
where α ∈ R and β > 0. For a review of the standard proper scoring rules, see Schlag et al. (2015,
Section 2).
It is well-known that a proper scoring rule is characterized by a class of strictly convex functions
(McCarthy, 1956; Savage, 1971). In particular, the scoring rule S is proper if and only if there exists
a strictly convex and subdifferentiable function φ : [0, 1]→ R such that Sr is a subtangent line at r
evaluated at 1 and 0 respectively. Formally, let φ be such that, for each r ∈ [0, 1] there are ar, br ∈ R
such that φ(s) ≥ ar + brs for all s ∈ [0, 1], with equality holding if and only if s = r. In this case,
Sr(ω0) := ar + br and Sr(ω1) := ar is a proper scoring rule. Strict convexity of φ guarantees that (1)
holds, while subdifferentiability at the boundary guarantees that the subtangent of φ is not vertical
and therefore S is well-defined. This last condition can be dispensed with, if we allow S to take
values in R instead of R, as often done in statistics. Whenever S is characterized by φ, we obtain
φ(µ) = Eµ(Sµ),
i.e., φ(µ) is the subject’s expected utility when he reports truthfully. As an example, the quadratic
scoring rule is characterized by the function φβ(µ) = α−βµ(1−µ). For an overview of the subgradient
characterization of proper scoring rules, see Gneiting and Raftery (2007).
Costly attention. We now enrich the agent’s preferences to allow for information acquisition by
means of costly attention (Sims, 2003). An attention strategy is a cognitive/thought experiment (viz.,
a signal), designed by the subject in an attempt to form updated “better” subjective beliefs. Given
his prior µ0, each attention strategy is identified by a (Bayes-plausible) distribution over posteriors,
chosen from the set Π(µ0) := {pi ∈ ∆([0, 1]) :
∫ 1
0
µdpi = µ0}. We define the degenerate zero-attention
strategy, µˆ0 ∈ Π(µ0), that puts probability 1 to the prior µ0. For notation simplicity, we henceforth
denote by Πˆ(µ0) := Π(µ0) \ {µˆ0} the set of non-degenerate attention strategies. If µ ∈ {0, 1} then
Πˆ(µ) = ∅. Given a prior µ0 and a scoring rule φ, the (expected) benefit of an attention strategy
pi ∈ Π(µ0) is equal to
Bφ(pi) := 〈φ, pi〉 − φ(µ0),
where 〈φ, pi〉 := Epi(φ) denotes the usual inner product duality. Since φ is strictly convex, we obtain
Bφ(pi) ≥ 0, with equality holding if and only if pi = µˆ0. That is, attention always has strictly positive
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benefits when the scoring rule is proper. However, attention is also costly. In particular, there is a
cost function,
C : ∆([0, 1])→ R+
assigning a non-negative cost to every attention strategy pi ∈ Π(µ) for every prior µ ∈ [0, 1]. Obvi-
ously the cost does not depend on the scoring rule, but only on the attention strategy. Attention
costs can be identified from choice data (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Chambers, Liu and Rehbeck, 2017).
They are part of the standard axiomatizatic characterizations of rationally inattentive preferences
(De Oliveira et al., 2017; Ellis, 2018). The common entropic cost function is discussed in Section 3.3.
Cost-benefit analysis. Following the rational inattention literature, given a prior µ0 and a proper
scoring rule φ, the subject will choose an attention strategy in Π(µ0) that maximizes the value
Vφ(pi) := Bφ(pi)− C(pi).
After (optimally) choosing some pi, the subject will first update his beliefs to some – also latent –
posterior µ ∈ supp(pi), and then – as φ is proper – he will truthfully report his posterior belief µ.
Therefore, in order to guarantee that the agent will report his prior belief µ0, it must be the case
that µˆ0 is a strictly dominant attention strategy. Whenever this is the case for every prior, we say
that the scoring rule is robust.
Definition 1. A scoring rule φ is robust, whenever it is proper and satisfies
Vφ(µˆ) > Vφ(pi) (2)
for every pi ∈ Πˆ(µ) and every µ ∈ [0, 1]. /
Then, we naturally ask: is there a robust scoring rule? And if yes, how does it look like?
3. Main result
As turns out, a robust scoring rule exists under some mild regularity conditions, imposed on the cost
function. In what follows in this section, we prove existence constructively, thus identifying an entire
family of robust scoring rules.
3.1. Axioms
We begin with two standard conditions, postulating that the zero-attention strategy is costless,
whereas every other attention strategy is costly. Formally:
(C1) Normalization: C(µˆ) = 0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
(C2) Attention is Costly: C(pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ Πˆ(µ) and all µ ∈ [0, 1].
The crucial restriction imposed by (C1) is that every zero-attention strategy induces the same cost
irrespective of the prior µ. The fact that this cost is set equal to 0 is merely a normalization.
Note that under (C1), a scoring rule is robust if and only if Vφ(pi) < 0 for every pi ∈ Πˆ(µ) and
every µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, (C2) postulates that new information is always costly, in the sense that the
cost of being attentive is higher than the normalized cost of the zero-attention strategy. This last
condition is necessary for the existence of a robust scoring rule: indeed, if there is some pi ∈ Πˆ(µ)
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with C(pi) ≤ C(µˆ), then for every strictly convex φ we obtain Vφ(µˆ) < Vφ(pi), implying that (2) is
violated, and therefore the subject will always update his prior belief.
Our next axiom is relatively new to the literature, postulating that the cost of an attention
strategy is only a function of the distribution of posteriors, and not of the underlying process that
yields this distribution. Formally:
(C3) Dynamic Consistency: If σ : [0, 1]→ ∆([0, 1]) satisfies σ(µ) ∈ Π(µ) for all µ ∈ [0, 1], then
C(Epi(σ)) = C(pi) + Epi(C ◦ σ) (3)
for all pi ∈ ∆([0, 1]).
Intuitively, if the subject chooses a sequential attention strategy, according to which he first picks
pi (first-period attention strategy) and then conditional on observing some posterior µ ∈ supp(pi)
he picks a new attention strategy σ(µ) (second-period attention strategy), the total cost that he
incurs is equal to the cost of his first-period strategy (C(pi)) plus the expected cost of his second-
period strategies (Epi(C ◦ σ)). The distribution of posteriors at the end of the second period is then
Epi(σ). Dynamic consistency postulates that the cost of an attention strategy that directly yields this
distribution of posteriors (viz., C(Epi(σ)) is equal to the total cost of the aforementioned sequential
attention strategy (viz., C(pi) + Epi(C ◦ σ)). Our notion of dynamic consistency is similar in spirit
to the one in the standard characterization of dynamic variational preferences (Maccheroni et al.,
2006).3
Our two axioms, (C1) and (C3), impose some basic coherency on the costs across different priors,
similarly to recent work on dynamic information acquisition (He´bert and Woodford, 2016; Morris
and Strack, 2017; Zhong, 2017), going beyond the decision-theoretic models of rational inattention,
which specify a cost function C : Π(µ) → R+ for each prior µ ∈ [0, 1] but remain silent on the
relationship of the costs across the different priors (De Oliveira et al., 2017; Ellis, 2018). Finally, as
we show later in the paper, cost functions that satisfy (C1) − (C3) are canonical in De Oliveira et
al.’s (2017) sense, i.e., they satisfy Blackwell monotonicity and convexity (see Section 7).
3.2. Existence
The following result answers our first question affirmatively, for the rather large class of cost functions
that satisfy our axioms.
Theorem 1 (Main result). If the cost function satisfies (C1)− (C3), there is a robust scoring rule.
The overall idea behind the previous result is to find a scoring rule that provides strong enough
incentives to induce truth-telling (viz., φ must be strictly convex), but not so strong that lead the
subject to update his beliefs (viz., φ should not be “too convex”). The proof is constructive, thus
allowing us not only to prove that a robust scoring rule exists, but also to identify its functional
form. Let us sketch the main steps here, while the full proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Sketch of the proof and Intuition. We begin with the following intermediate result, which
provides a characterization of the cost functions that satisfy our axioms by means of a property
that has recently attracted interest in the rational inattention literature (Caplin et al., 2017). A
similar result has been proven by Zhong (2017) in a somewhat different context, relying on standard
properties of mutual information (e.g., Cover and Thomas, 2006).
3Of course in their paper the interpretation is different in that costs are incurred by nature, rather than by the
decision maker. Nevertheless their condition – similarly to ours – guarantees that that costs are time-consistent. I am
indebted to Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci for pointing out this connection to me.
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Lemma 1. The cost function satisfies (C1)− (C3) if and only if it satisfies:
Posterior-Separability: There is a strictly concave function K : [0, 1]→ R such that
C(pi) = K(µ)− 〈K, pi〉 (4)
for every pi ∈ Π(µ) and every µ ∈ [0, 1].
One can interpret K(µ) as the cost of the most informative attention strategy when the prior belief
is µ, i.e., it is the cost that the subject must incur in order to learn the true state with certainty.
The curvature of K puts a bound on the incentives that the scoring rule provides. Loosely speaking,
“φ must be less convex than −K”, i.e., a proper scoring rule φ is robust if and only if the function
ψ := φ+K (5)
is strictly concave.4 Therefore, we must focus entirely on proper scoring rules that satisfy this last
property. The most obvious such candidate is
f := a− bK (6)
which is obviously strictly convex for every a ∈ R and every b ∈ (0, 1). In fact, if K is subdifferentiable
at the boundary of [0, 1], so is f , and therefore we can simply set φ := f .
So let us focus on the case where K is not subdifferentiable, and a fortiori f is not either. One
such example is the entropic cost function that we study in detail in the next section.
Lemma 2. Consider a strictly convex function f : [0, 1] → R. Then, there exists a strictly convex
and subdifferentiable function g : [0, 1]→ R such that f − g is convex.
The previous result, takes f as a benchmark and introduces the strictly convex function g which
provides weaker incentives than f , i.e., formally, Bg(pi) ≤ Bf (pi) for every pi ∈ ∆([0, 1]). Therefore,
since Bf (pi) < C(pi), it will also be the case that Bg(pi) < C(pi), thus guaranteeing that (2) will be
satisfied by g. Finally, since g is subdifferentiable, we can set φ := g, thus completing the proof of
our theorem. Note that our proof of Lemma 2 is constructive, implying that not only do we prove
existence, but we also identify an entire family of robust scoring rules.
3.3. Entropic attention costs
The most common functional form of attention costs within the rational inattention literature is the
entropic cost specification (Sims, 2003, 2006; Caplin et al., 2017), which among other nice properties,
allows us to provide microeconomic foundations to the multinomial logit model (Matejka and McKay,
2015). Accordingly, the cost of an arbitrary pi ∈ Π(µ0) is equal to
Cκ(pi) = κ
(
H(µ0)− 〈H, pi〉
)
, (7)
where H(µ) = −µ log µ − (1 − µ) log(1 − µ) is the Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948), and κ > 0 is
a multiplier parameter. It is straightforward to verify that Cκ is posterior-separable with K = κH
being the corresponding function whose expected decrease gives the cost of attention. Therefore, Cκ
satisfies (C1)− (C3), and by Theorem 1, there exists a robust scoring rule. Since entropic attention
costs are widely-used in applications and empirical studies, we go a step further asking whether there
is a robust quadratic scoring rule φβ(µ) = α− βµ(1− µ). The following result answers the previous
question affirmatively.
4Indeed, observe that maxpi∈Π(µ) V (pi) coincides with the concave closure of ψ evaluated at µ. Hence, by Kamenica
and Gentzkow’s (2011) concavification method we can characterize the optimal attention strategy.
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Proposition 1. For an entropic cost function Cκ, the scoring rule φβ is robust if and only if β ≤ 2κ.
Note that only the parameter β is relevant for robustness. This is not surprising, given that the
incentives of a scoring rule are measured in terms of its convexity, and the constant α does not affect
the degree of convexity of φβ, but rather it simply rescales the payments by adding a constant.
The proof of the previous result exploits the fact that H is twice differentiable. Indeed, the
condition β ≤ 2κ is equivalent to ψβ := φβ + K being strictly concave, which – as we have already
discussed in the previous section – is equivalent to φβ being robust.
4. Approximate robustness
Often times in practical applications, the experimenter accepts a small error in the elicitation of
the subject’s prior beliefs, either because she cannot detect small differences (say due to restrictions
in the experimental technology) or because she does not care about minor mistakes in the elicited
beliefs. Formally, for a given small ε ≥ 0, the experimenter aims at picking a scoring rule that elicits
a belief not further than ε away from the subject’s prior. We will call such a scoring rule ε-robust,
or generally approximately robust.
Such willingness to accept minor elicitation errors allows the experimenter to choose from a wider
set of scoring rules. In particular, she can now also use weakly proper scoring rules that make the
subject indifferent between certain reports thus often leading to misreporting. Intuitively, a scoring
rule is weakly proper if reporting truthfully is one of the optimal reports, but not necessarily the
only one. Formally, S is weakly proper whenever, for all µ ∈ [0, 1],
Eµ(Sµ) ≥ Eµ(Sr) (8)
for every r ∈ [0, 1]. Geometrically, the function φ that characterizes the scoring rule S is (only)
weakly convex. Indeed, φ may be linear in some subintervals I ⊆ [0, 1], implying that every report
(at least) in the interior of I yields the same utility vector, i.e., Sr = Sr′ for every r, r
′ ∈ int(I).
Thus, for a weakly proper scoring rule φ, we define the set of optimal reports
Iφ(µ) := arg max
r∈[0,1]
Eµ(Sr) (9)
when the posterior is µ. Geometrically, Iφ(µ) is the largest interval of µ where φ is linear. Obviously,
the scoring rule is proper if and only if Iφ(µ) = {µ} for every µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we are ready to define
approximate robustness.
Definition 2. A scoring rule φ is ε-robust, if for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and for all ν ∈ supp(pi) such that
pi ∈ arg maxρ∈Π(µ) Vφ(ρ), it is the case that
Iφ(ν) ⊆ Bε(µ), (10)
where Bε(µ) := {ν ∈ [0, 1] : |µ− ν| ≤ ε} is the closed ε-neighborhood of µ. /
Intuitively, every optimal attention strategy pi ∈ Π(µ) puts positive probability to posteriors
which will lead to reports not further away than ε from the prior. That is, the two forces that bring
the optimal report away from the prior (viz., linearity of the scoring rule and incentives to acquire
information), even when combined, will not lead further than ε away from the prior belief. Clearly,
when a scoring rule is proper, it is ε-robust too if every optimal attention strategy yields posteriors
at most ε away from the prior, i.e., in this case, only the second force (viz., the incentives to acquire
information) may lead the subject to misreport.
Approximate robustness often proves to be useful by exploiting the tradeoff between simplicity of
the scoring rule and the margin of error. Let us illustrate some cases where approximate robustness
allows us to simplify the scoring rule, thus making it easier to implement.
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4.1. Quadratic scoring rules
The scoring rule that is most commonly used in practice is the quadratic. As we have already
mentioned above, a quadratic scoring rules is characterized by the function φβ(µ) = α− βµ(1− µ).
While quadratic scoring rules are robust in some cases (e.g., see Section 3.3), it is not always so.
Example 1. Consider the posterior-separable cost function which is characterized by K(µ) = −µ3.
Note that the second derivative of K is not bounded away from 0, viz., the cost function becomes
arbitrarily flat (close to 0). Now consider a quadratic scoring rule φβ, and observe that its second
derivative is bounded away from 0. Then, we note that ψ′′β(µ) = 2β−6µ, implying that ψβ = φβ +K
is convex in [0, β/3], as illustrated in Figure 2 below. Hence, φβ is not robust for any β > 0. /
Of course, in the previous example, a robust scoring rule exists (by Theorem 1). However, it is
not quadratic. Now suppose that the experimenter is willing to accept a margin of error, as long as
she can use a quadratic scoring rule, which is in general deemed simpler and easier to understand.
Thus, we ask: is there an approximately robust quadratic scoring rule instead?
Proposition 2. If the cost function satisfies (C1)− (C3) with the corresponding K being polynomial,
then for every ε > 0 there exists an ε-robust quadratic scoring rule.
The previous result can be directly extended to any K with finitely many roots of the second
derivative. Given that most cost functions that are typically considered in the literature satisfy this
last condition, our result is quite generic. Therefore, for practical purposes, quadratic scoring rules
can effectively elicit the subject’s prior with arbitrary precision. Let us illustrate our result in the
context of our previous example.
Example 1 (continued). For starters, notice that for β ≥ 3, the function ψβ is strictly convex in
[0, 1], implying that for every prior the subject will choose the most informative attention strategy,
and therefore φβ is not ε-robust for any ε < 1. Thus, we focus on quadratic scoring rules with
β < 3. In each such case, as we have already shown above, ψβ is strictly convex in [0, β/3] and
strictly concave in [β/3, 1], as illustrated in the following figure. For starters, verify that ψβ is
(µ)
α
β
3
ψβ
1β
2
Figure 2: Approximately robust quadratic scoring rule.
strictly decreasing in [0, 1] for every β < 3. Then, note that there exists some µβ > β/3 such that
ψ′β(µβ) = (ψβ(µβ) − ψβ(0))/µβ. Indeed, it turns out that µβ = β/2 for every β < 3. That is, the
concave closure of ψβ is linear in [0, β/2] and strictly concave in [β/2, 1]. Hence, by Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), if µ ∈ (0, β/2) then the subject’s optimal attention strategy is pi ∈ Π(µ) such that
supp(pi) = {0, β/2}, i.e., the subject will update his beliefs to either 0 or to β/2. On the other hand,
if µ ∈ [β/2, 1] then the subject’s optimal attention strategy is µˆ, i.e., the subject will not update
his prior. In both cases, the subject will report his posterior truthfully, as φβ is proper. Finally, for
every ε > 0, if we set β := 2ε then φβ is ε-robust. /
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The proof of Proposition 2 has a similar logic as the one of the previous example. In particular,
for every ε > 0, we choose some β small enough so that the (finitely many) intervals where ψβ is
convex become small enough, in which case the subject does not use an attention strategy that brings
him further than ε away from the prior.
4.2. Discrete scoring rules
Suppose that the subject can only report beliefs from the finite set
R :=
{ 0
n
,
1
n
, . . . ,
n
n
}
for an arbitrary n ∈ N.5 We henceforth denote the k-th available report by rk := k/n for each
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Such scoring rules are called discrete and are quite common in experiments
where the subjects are asked to choose a report from some predetermined grid of probabilities. The
practical advantage is that discrete scoring rules are easier to implement, as they can be presented
to the subject in the form of a list. On the negative side, the experimenter can only hope for a
(1/n)-approximation of the subject’s beliefs, i.e., for each prior µ ∈ [rk, rk+1] the experimenter will
at best elicit rk or rk+1. Thus, we naturally ask: Is it indeed always possible to construct a discrete
scoring rule that elicits a belief at most 1/n away from the subject’s prior? If yes, we then call it
(1/n)-robust discrete scoring rule.
Proposition 3. If the cost function satisfies (C1)− (C3), there is an 1n-robust discrete scoring rule.
The technical difficulty with discrete scoring rules is that they induce piecewise linear expected
benefits, thus often providing stronger incentives for attention than the usual scoring rules which are
strictly convex. This is particularly the case when the subject’s latent belief lies nearby the kinks
of the discrete scoring rule.6 Hence, it becomes easier for a non-degenerate attention strategy to
be profitable. Thus, we need to counteract these increased incentives, by making the scoring rule
flatter, until we offset them. Let us provide some intuition on how we construct such a scoring rule
for n = 2. The full proof (for every n ∈ N) is relegated to Appendix B.
Sketch of the proof (for n = 2). Fix a strictly concave function K. The set of available re-
ports is R = {0, 1/2, 1}. For every pair of consecutive available reports, take the middle point, viz.,
1/4 and 3/4 respectively. Now, we consider a convex and piecewise linear function φ, with kinks at
the middle points, 1/4 and 3/4. The extension of φ from the interval [1/4, 3/4] to the entire unit
interval, when evaluated at 0 and 1, yields the two possible payments when 1/2 is reported, and
likewise for the other two intervals (viz., [0, 1/4] and [3/4, 1]) and the corresponding reports (viz.,
0 and 1 respectively). Note that this discrete scoring rule elicits the closest report to the subject’s
(posterior) belief, as illustrated in Figure 3. For instance, for a posterior µ ∈ [0, 1/2], the subject
reports 0 if µ ∈ [0, 1/4] and reports 1/2 if µ ∈ [1/4, 1/2]. Subsequently, observe that φ is constructed
in a way such that the concave closure of ψ = φ + K is linear in two intervals [µ11, µ
2
1] ⊆ [0, 1/2]
and [µ12, µ
2
2] ⊆ [1/2, 1], and strictly concave in every other convex subset of [0, 1] \ ([µ11, µ21]∪ [µ12, µ22]).
Therefore, by the usual concavification argument (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), the subject will
update his beliefs if and only if his prior belongs to (µ11, µ
2
1)∪ (µ12, µ22). Indeed, take for instance some
µ ∈ [0, 1/2]. Then consider the following cases: (i) if µ ∈ (µ11, µ21) then the subject’s optimal attention
5Our entire analysis can be directly extended to any finite set R ⊂ [0, 1], e.g., in cases where the subject can only
report a fraction of 2 or a fraction of 3.
6The kinks of the scoring rule do not necessarily coincide with the available reports. For instance in the upcoming
example (Figure 3), the available reports are R = {0, 1/2, 1} whereas the kinks appear at {1/4, 3/4}.
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Figure 3: Approximately robust discrete scoring rules.
strategy is pi ∈ Π(µ) such that supp(pi) = {µ11, µ21}, implying that she updates to either µ11 (in which
case he reports 0) or µ21 (in which case he reports 1/2), (ii) if µ ∈ [0, µ11] then his optimal attention
strategy is µˆ and he reports 0, and (iii) if µ ∈ [µ21, 1/2] then again his optimal attention strategy
is µˆ and he reports 1/2. Hence, he will report either 0 or 1/2, implying that φ is (1/2)-robust, as
desired.
5. Cost uncertainty
Sometimes, the experimenter cannot pin down the subject’s cost function with certainty. This
is typically due to the experimenter not having enough data to calibrate the subject’s (actual)
cost function. In such cases, she instead resorts to an estimated probability distribution over cost
functions. Can the experimenter then be sufficiently certain that she will approximate the subject’s
prior beliefs, although she is not certain of his cost specification? 7
Let C denote the space of continuous functions K : [0, 1] → R, together with topology induced
by the sup norm ‖ · ‖∞. Moreover, let K ⊂ C be the (convex) space of strictly concave functions
such that K(0) = K(1) = 0. Each cost function satisfying (C1) − (C3) is identified by a unique
K ∈ K.8 Outside K we find costs K ∈ C that violate one or more of our axioms (C1) − (C3). For
instance, a constant function K violates (C2) by making every attention strategy costless, and as a
result no scoring rule approximates the prior beliefs with precision better than 1, i.e., we get pure
noise irrespective of the scoring rule that we use. Uncertainty about the subject’s costs is described
by a distribution P ∈ ∆(C). Whenever P (K) = 1, the experimenter is certain that the subject’s cost
function satisfies (C1)− (C3).
For each scoring rule φ, define the function εφ : C → R+ by
εKφ := inf{ε ≥ 0 : φ is ε-robust given K}, (11)
7I am indebted to Burkhard Schipper for suggesting this approach.
8In principle, each cost function is associated with an entire class of strictly concave functions. Our normalization
identifies a single element of this class, and in this sense K represents the set of costs that satisfy (C1) − (C3). Note
that focusing on continuous functions is without loss of generality: by concavity, K is continuous in (0, 1), and possible
discontinuities at the boundary make it easier for a scoring rule to be robust. We further elaborate in Footnote 10 in
Appendix C.
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which provides a bound on the approximation of the prior that the experimenter can achieve with
φ for each K ∈ C. Note that εφ is upper semi-continuous (Lemma C1). Hence, {K ∈ C : εKφ ≤ ε}
is Borel measurable. That is, the event that “the scoring rule φ is ε-robust” is expressible in the
experimenter’s language, and therefore the experimenter assigns some probability to it.
Definition 3. A scoring rule φ is (ε, δ)-robust (or in general, approximately robust) if
P
({K ∈ C : εKφ ≤ ε}) ≥ 1− δ, (12)
given some fixed ε ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0. /
That is, the probability of eliciting a belief further than ε away from the prior is smaller than δ. Can
we always find an approximately robust scoring rule under uncertainty about the cost function?
Theorem 2. If P (K) = p, then for all ε > 0 and δ > 1− p there is an (ε, δ)-robust scoring rule.
The intuition of the previous result is that we can construct a scoring rule that ε-approximates
the prior with probability arbitrarily close to the probability that the experimenter attaches to the cost
function satisfying (C1) − (C3). For instance, if the experimenter is certain that the subject’s cost
satisfies (C1)− (C3), then she can approximate the prior with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Sketch of the proof. The proof is somewhat similar in logic to the one of Proposition 3. In
particular, for an arbitrary ε > 0 we take some n ∈ N such that 2/n ≤ ε. Then, we construct a
weakly convex and piecewise linear function φγ with kinks at every k/n, such that the slope between
two consecutive linear segments increases by a constant term of γ > 0. Then, we show that for
every K ∈ K there exists some γ which is sufficiently small to guarantee that the concave closure of
ψγ := φγ + K will only be linear on intervals of length at most 1/n. Hence, for an arbitrary prior
µ ∈ [0, 1], the optimal attention strategy will yield a posterior at most 1/n away from µ, and the
subject will subsequently report a belief at most 1/n away from the posterior. Hence, overall the
subject with a cost function K will report a belief not further than ε away from the prior, when the
scoring rule is φγ. Finally, we select γ to be sufficiently small so that sufficiently many cost functions
satisfy the aforementioned property. More specifically, for any given δ > 1 − P (K), we show that
there is a small enough γ, such that the set {K ∈ K : φγ is ε-robust given K} receives probability
at least equal to 1− δ.
Of course, the scoring rule proposed in our (constructive) existence proof is not the only one.
Indeed, we can often find other (ε, δ)-robust scoring rules. For starters, it is obvious that our result
can be directly adjusted to discrete scoring rules. Furthermore, we can often obtain (ε, δ)-robust
quadratic scoring rules, as illustrated in the example below.
Example 2. Let P be a uniformly distributed over the set of entropic cost functions in E := {Cκ|κ ∈
[0, 1]} with multiplier parameter in the unit interval (see Section 3.3). Obviously, the closer κ gets to
0, the more difficult it becomes for a scoring rule to be robust. Indeed, there is no quadratic scoring
rule that elicits the subject’s prior with probability 1. Nevertheless, for any δ > 0 (arbitrarily close
to 1), a quadratic scoring rule φβ with β ≤ 2(1 − δ) will elicit the subject’s prior with probability
larger or equal than 1− δ (by Proposition 1). /
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6. Revisiting our motivation
6.1. Testing decision-theoretic models under uncertainty
Suppose that we want to test a decision-theoretic model under uncertainty. For the sake of our
argument, consider Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as our benchmark model, noting that we
need to have data about both the individual’s choices and his (prior) beliefs. As we have already
discussed throughout the paper, the term “prior beliefs” refers to his beliefs at the moment his choice
is made. In fact, it is plausible that before encountering the decision problem, he may not even have
well-formed beliefs. The latter is not deemed to be an issue for us, as we are not interested in how
beliefs are formed in the period leading to the individual’s decision, but rather how he responds to
these beliefs. In particular, we reject SEU if and only if the observed choice does not maximize the
individual’s SEU given his prior beliefs. Hence, all our efforts are going to focus on the elicitation of
the individual’s prior beliefs.
For starters, notice that elicitation must take place after the choice has been made, as we cannot
control how the individual responds to the incentives provided by the decision problem itself. Note
that, unlike the experimental literature, the problem here is not whether belief elicitation will affect
the behavior,9 but rather that the individual may use a (non-degenerate) attention strategy between
the elicitation stage and the decision stage (as a response to the material payoffs provided by the
decision problem). Hence, elicitation must necessarily follow the decision. In this case, the only
incentives that the individual has are the ones that stem from the scoring rule. Therefore, as long
as the scoring rule is robust, a rational individual will not further update his beliefs.
Finally, let us stress that our work is not concerned with the experimental mechanics of belief
elicitation. In particular, we have nothing substantial to contribute to the debate on the effect
of belief elicitation on behavior, or to the question of whether incentives matter empirically when
eliciting beliefs, or to the question of whether experimental subjects best respond to their stated
beliefs. What we are actually establishing is that it is theoretically feasible to test decision-theoretic
models under uncertainty, something far from being ex ante obvious.
6.2. Eliciting population beliefs via surveys
Suppose that we want to elicit the distribution of beliefs about some event in a large population.
This would be of particular relevance, for instance, to marketing practitioners who are interested in
the public perception for some product or political campaigns who would like to know the public
opinion on some proposed reform. In these cases, we are not interested in obtaining an estimate of
the true state of nature, but rather of what the population believes about the state of nature.
To elicit such population beliefs we need to first truthfully elicit individual prior beliefs in a (large)
representative sample, and then use the empirical frequency as an estimate of the population’s
distribution. Note the importance of eliciting each individual’s true prior beliefs. Suppose, for
instance, that the true distribution of beliefs is bell-shaped, and let the elicitation mechanism provide
strong incentives so that a significant portion of the sample chooses informative attention strategies,
which push their posterior beliefs towards the two extremes, thus leading to a bimodal empirical
frequency with the corresponding biases. Furthermore, note that in such a setting individual cost
functions are typically not known. Thus, our theory of approximate robustness under cost uncertainty
(Section 5) becomes very relevant.
9Even experimentally there is no consensus as to whether belief elicitation affects followup decisions (Schotter and
Trevino, 2014, Sect. 3.3).
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As we have already mentioned, we are not interested in learning the true state of nature, but
rather what the population believes about it, which is why standard elicitation mechanisms, such
as prediction markets (Hanson, 2003), would most likely yield biased estimates, primarily because
they typically attract participants who put significant effort into learning the true state. Finally,
traditional surveys are typically not incentivized (for an exception to this rule, see Grisley and
Kellogg, 1983). This is mainly due to practical reasons. For instance, providing monetary incentives
is often very costly. Additionally, beliefs are mainly elicited as part of large household surveys
and are typically about long-term events, which therefore cannot be incentivized based on their
realization. Our proposed theory on the other hand primarily applies to surveys run by large firms
or organizations or campaigns with stakes in the population beliefs about short-term events.
7. Discussion
Other related literature. Scoring rules were originally introduced by meteorologists (Brier, 1950),
before being further developed by statisticians (Good, 1952; McCarthy, 1956; Savage, 1971), and
eventually being adopted by several disciplines, such as economics, accounting, business, manage-
ment, psychology, political science and computer science (see Offerman et al., 2009, p. 1462). Within
economics, the theory of scoring rules has mostly focused on introducing new mechanisms (Hossain
and Okui, 2013; Karni, 2009), on relaxing the underlying assumptions of the standard mechanisms,
such as for instance risk-neutrality (Savage, 1971; Offerman et al., 2009; Schlag and van der Weele,
2013) or the expected utility hypothesis (Karni, 1999; Chambers, 2008; Offerman et al., 2009), and
on understanding the technical relationships to other economics models (Chambers, Healy and Lam-
bert, 2017). Scoring rules are also used in various economic applications, focusing for instance on
incentive schemes in organizations (Thomson, 1979), information markets (Hanson, 2003; Ostrovsky,
2012) and strategic indistinguishability (Bergemann et al., 2017). Finally, there is large experimental
literature, focusing primarily on the role of risk-aversion (Offerman et al., 2009; Armantier and Treich,
2013), the comparison of deterministic and stochastic scoring rules (Selten et al., 1999; Harrison et
al., 2013, 2014) and the elicitation of beliefs in games (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Costa-Gomes and
Weizsa¨cker, 2008; Palfrey and Wang, 2009; Rutstro¨m and Wilcox, 2009). For two recent literature
reviews, we refer to Schotter and Trevino (2014) and Schlag et al. (2015).
Rational inattention models first appeared in macroeconomics (Sims, 2003, 2006; Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt, 2009), before attracting interest of microtheorists. The latter have mostly focused on
providing axiomatic foundations (De Oliveira et al., 2017; Ellis, 2018) and on designing revealed-
preference tests for identifying the attention costs from choice data (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Cham-
bers, Liu and Rehbeck, 2017; Caplin et al., 2017). Recently, there is interest in dynamic models of
rational inattention (He´bert and Woodford, 2016; Morris and Strack, 2017; Zhong, 2017). There are
also various economic applications of rational inattention – usually with entropic costs – on topics
like discrimination (Bartos˘ et al., 2016), pricing (Matejka, 2016) and electoral competition (Mate-
jka and Tabellini, 2016). Finally, there is recent work on experimentally testing models of rational
inattention (Dean and Neligh, 2017). For an overview of this literature, see Caplin (2016).
Other experimental currencies. Throughout the paper we have focused exclusively on scoring
rules that pay in monetary payoffs, i.e., formally, S takes values in R. However, as we have already
mentioned, there are large literatures dealing with scoring rules that pay either in probabilities over
a fixed prize or allowing for infinite rewards/losses, i.e., formally, S takes values in [0, 1] in the former
and in R in the latter case, respectively. Let us first briefly present the motivation and then discuss
our results for each of these alternative mechanisms.
Scoring rules that pay in probability currencies are called stochastic and have been introduced in
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economics in order to deal with subjects who are not risk-neutral (Savage, 1971; Schlag and van der
Weele, 2013). Formally, Sr(ω) ∈ [0, 1] is the objective probability of the subject winning the prize,
when he reports r and the realized state is ω. In this case the subject’s expected utility is linear in the
probability of winning the prize irrespective of his risk preferences, and our analysis follows verbatim
except for one small detail, viz., in order for a function φ to characterize a stochastic scoring rule,
not only should it be subdifferentiable, but it should also have at every point a subtangent that takes
values in [0, 1] both when evaluated at 0 and at 1. The latter holds whenever φ satisfies the following
two conditions: 0 ≤ φ(0) + φ′(0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ φ(1) − φ′(1) ≤ 1, for some φ′(µ) ∈ ∂φ(µ), for each
µ ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, for a robust φ there exists some β ∈ R and a sufficiently small γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
ψ(µ) := γ(φ(µ)+βµ) satisfies the previous two inequalities, thus implying that ψ is a robust stochastic
scoring rule. It is important to mention that stochastic scoring rules have been criticized based on
experimental evidence (Selten et al., 1999), although such criticism is not unanimous (Harrison et
al., 2013, 2014). For an in-depth discussion on the role of risk preferences, we refer to Offerman et
al. (2009).
Scoring rules that allow for infinite rewards/losses are common in statistics (Gneiting and Raftery,
2007). The main reason behind such generalization is in order to be able to dispense with the subd-
ifferentiability of φ. More specifically, when S is allowed to take infinite values, every strictly convex
function φ characterizes a proper scoring rule, even if it is not subdifferentiable at the boundary. In
this last case, the respective subtangents are infinitely sloped, which is why S needs to be unbounded.
In fact, under such generalized scoring rules, the proof of our main result becomes straightforward,
viz., the function f = γ − λK (see (6)) is always robust. However, it would still be very difficult to
practically implement such a scoring rule.
Canonical attention costs. In the rational inattention literature, there are two natural regularity
properties that we typically require the cost function to satisfy, viz., Blackwell monotonicity and
convexity (De Oliveira et al., 2017). First, let us define the (partial) Blackwell order in Π(µ). For
two attention strategies, pi, ρ ∈ Π(µ), we say that pi is Blackwell more informative than ρ, and we
write pi D ρ, whenever 〈f, pi〉 ≥ 〈f, ρ〉 for every convex function f : [0, 1]→ R (Blackwell, 1953). The
two axioms postulate that, for every µ ∈ [0, 1], the following hold respectively:
(C4) Blackwell monotonicity: C(pi) ≥ C(ρ) for all pi, ρ ∈ Π(µ) with pi D ρ.
(C5) Convexity: C(λpi + (1− λ)ρ) ≤ λC(pi) + (1− λ)C(ρ) for all pi, ρ ∈ Π(µ) and all λ ∈ (0, 1).
The obvious question is whether our axioms (C1)−(C3) imply (C4)−(C5), i.e., are the cost functions
that we consider canonical?
Starting with Blackwell monotonicity, take pi, ρ ∈ Π(µ) such that pi D ρ. Then, by setting
f := −K, we obtain
−〈K, pi〉 ≥ −〈K, ρ〉 ⇒ K(µ)− 〈K, pi〉 ≥ K(µ)− 〈K, ρ〉
⇒ C(pi) ≥ C(ρ),
with the second implication following from posterior separability. Hence, (C4) holds as desired.
Switching now to convexity, take pi, ρ ∈ Π(µ) and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, we obtain
C(λpi + (1− λ)ρ) = K(µ)− 〈K,λpi + (1− λ)ρ〉
= λK(µ)− λ〈K, pi〉+ (1− λ)K(µ)− (1− λ)〈K, ρ〉
= λC(pi) + (1− λ)C(ρ),
with the first and third equations following from posterior separability, and the second one following
from the linearity of the inner product. Hence, our axioms imply an even stronger axiom than (C5),
viz., C is linear in Π(µ).
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Multinomial beliefs. Throughout the paper we have focused on binary state spaces, thus eliciting
the probability of a single event. The technical difficulty with directly extending our main result
to the multinomial case lies on the extension of Lemma 2 to higher-dimension euclidean spaces not
being straightforward. Nevertheless, for practical purposes, this problem is of minor concern. Indeed,
on the one hand, whenever the function K is subdifferentiable at the boundary of ∆(Ω), this lemma
is not necessary and our Theorem 1 holds verbatim for any finite Ω. Furthermore, our analysis on
approximate robustness can be extended to the case of multinomial beliefs. Hence, our assumption
on Ω being binary is essentially without loss of generality.
Violations of posterior-separability. As we have already discussed earlier in the paper, posterior-
separability has both solid axiomatic foundations and is supported by recent experimental evidence.
Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, it is of some interest to understand whether our theory
can be extended to broader classes of cost functions. It is quite obvious that violations of (C2) always
lead to non-existence of robust scoring rules. Nevertheless, depending on the particular violations of
(C2), approximate robustness can be sometimes established, e.g., if C is characterized by a weakly
concave K, then there exists some δ > 0 such that for every ε ≥ δ there is an ε-robust scoring
rule. On the other hand, violations of (C3) are more challenging to tackle, and would require a more
systematic study in their own right. The technical reason is that in the absence of (C3) we cannot
necessarily characterize the costs with a function on the same domain as the benefits, and therefore
completely different approaches have to be followed.
Lying aversion. Experimental evidence in different contexts suggests that, in the absence of ex-
plicit incentives, subjects often exhibit aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009).
Whenever this is the case, every linear scoring rule would be robust, as long as his cost function
satisfies (C1)− (C2). For instance consider non-incentivized belief elicitation (i.e., Sr(ω) = 0 for all
ω ∈ Ω and r ∈ [0, 1]), and observe that the subject will not update his beliefs as the expected benefits
of paying attention will be equal to 0, and they will be therefore offset by the strictly positive costs
that any attention strategy will induce. Then, due to lying aversion the subject will report his true
belief, given that he will be indifferent between lying and telling the truth. Of course, it is important
to stress that, specifically in the context of belief elicitation, the experimental evidence on the effects
of monetary incentives are not conclusive and therefore it remains unclear whether we can rely on
lying aversion.
Testing our theory. As we have already mentioned throughout the paper, there is no consensus in
the literature as to whether monetary incentives are needed in order to elicit the subject’s true beliefs.
Furthermore, if incentives are needed, it is also unclear whether the strength of said incentives plays
a crucial role, as our theory suggests. In either case, this is a question of systematic experimental
testing. The most obvious way to proceed would be to vary the convexity of the scoring rule across
treatments.
A. Proofs of Section 3
A.1. Intermediate results
Proof of Lemma 1. Sufficiency. Let C be posterior separable. Then, it is obvious that C(µˆ) =
0 for every µ ∈ [0, 1], thus proving (C1). By strict concavity of K it follows that C(pi) = K(µ) −
〈K, pi〉 > 0 for every pi ∈ Πˆ(µ) and every µ ∈ [0, 1], thus proving (C2). Finally, for an arbitrary
17
σ : [0, 1]→ ∆([0, 1]) satisfying σ(µ) ∈ Π(µ) for every µ ∈ [0, 1], and an arbitrary pi ∈ Π(µ0),
C(pi) + Epi(C ◦ σ) = K(µ0)− 〈K, pi〉+ Epi(K − 〈K, σ〉)
= K(µ0)− 〈K, pi〉+ 〈K, pi〉 − 〈K,Epi(σ)〉
= C(Epi(σ)),
with the first and the third equation following from posterior-separability, and the second one fol-
lowing from the linearity of the expectation (Epi) and the inner product (〈K, ·〉). Hence, (C3) is also
proven.
Necessity. Assume that C satisfies (C1) − (C3), and let K : [0, 1] → R+ be the cost of learning
the state with certainty, i.e., K(µ) := C(σ(µ)) for each µ ∈ [0, 1], where σ(µ) ∈ Π(µ) induces with
probability µ the posterior that puts probability 1 to ω0 and with probability 1 − µ the posterior
that puts probability 1 to ω1. Now, for an arbitrary pi ∈ Π(µ0),
C(pi) = C(Epi(σ))− Epi(C ◦ σ)
= K(µ0)− 〈K, pi〉,
with the first equation following directly from rearranging (C3), and the second one following from the
definition of K. Hence, it suffices to prove that K is strictly concave. Take arbitrary 0 ≤ µ1 < µ2 ≤ 1
and θ ∈ (0, 1), and let pi0 ∈ Πˆ(θµ1 + (1 − θ)µ2) be the attention strategy that assigns probability θ
to µ1 and probability 1− θ to µ2. Then,
K(θµ1 + (1− θ)µ2) = C(pi0) + θK(µ1) + (1− θ)K(µ2)
> θK(µ1) + (1− θ)K(µ2),
with the equation above following from (C3), and the inequality following from (C2). Hence, K is
strictly concave, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. If f is subdifferentiable in [0, 1] then the result follows trivially by setting
g := f . Therefore, we assume that there exists x ∈ {0, 1} such that the subderivative
∂f(x) := {t ∈ R : f(y) ≥ f(x) + t(y − x) for all y ∈ [0, 1]}
is empty.
Step 1: By convexity, f is continuous in (0, 1). Let fˆ : [0, 1] → R be the continuous extension of
f : (0, 1) → R to [0, 1]. It is straightforward that fˆ exists and is strictly convex. Let us now prove
that f − fˆ is convex. Take arbitrary 0 ≤ x1 < x2 ≤ 1 and θ ∈ (0, 1). Since (θx1 + (1 − θ)x2) ∈
(0, 1), we trivially obtain (f − fˆ)(θx1 + (1 − θ)x2) = 0. Moreover, by f(x) ≥ fˆ(x), we obtain
θ(f − fˆ)(x1) + (1− θ)(f − fˆ)(x2) ≥ 0. Hence, f − fˆ is convex, as claimed. Therefore, it suffices to
prove that there is a strictly convex and subdifferentiable g such that fˆ − g is convex.
Step 2: For each x ∈ [0, 1] define the left ax := fˆ ′−(x) and right bx := fˆ ′+(x) derivative respectively.
We adopt the notational convention that a0 = −∞ and b1 := ∞. It follows from (strict) convexity
of fˆ that ∂fˆ(x) = [ax, bx], with ax = bx whenever fˆ is differentiable at x. Moreover, ∂fˆ is strictly
increasing, i.e., x < y if and only if ax ≤ bx < ay ≤ by. Obviously, fˆ is subdifferentiable if and only
if −∞ < b0 < a1 < ∞, in which case we simply set g := fˆ . Hence, we henceforth focus on the
case where ∂fˆ(x) = ∅ for some x ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., b0 = −∞ or a1 = ∞. Let x0 ∈ [0, 1] be the unique
minimizer of fˆ , and define the strictly increasing function F : [0, 1]→ R as follows: F (x) := ax > 0
for all x ∈ (x0, 1], F (x) := bx < 0 for all x ∈ [0, x0), and F (x0) = 0.
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Step 3: Since fˆ is continuous in a closed interval, it is also absolutely continuous, and therefore by
the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, F is Lebesgue integrable and
fˆ(x) = fˆ(0) +
∫ x
0
F (t)dt. (A.1)
Take a strictly increasing Lipschitz function h : R→ [−1, 1] (with Lipschitz constant c ≤ 1), and let
G := h ◦ F . Since F is Lebesgue integrable, so is G. Thus, we can define g : [0, 1]→ R by
g(x) := fˆ(0) +
∫ x
0
G(t)dt. (A.2)
Since G is strictly increasing, g is strictly convex, and therefore subdifferentiable in (0, 1). Moreover,
since G takes values in [−1, 1], it is the case that ∫ x
0
G(t)dt ≥ −2x, implying that g(x) ≥ g(0)− 2x
for every x ∈ [0, 1], i.e., g is subdifferentiable at 0. We prove identically that g subdifferentiable also
at 1, implying that it is subdifferentiable in [0, 1].
Step 4: Let us finally prove that fˆ − g is convex. Consider arbitrary 0 ≤ x1 < x2 ≤ 1. Since
h is Lipschitz with constant c ≤ 1, it is the case that F (x2) − F (x1) ≥ G(x2) − G(x1), implying
that F −G is increasing. Moreover, by (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain (fˆ − g)(x) = ∫ x
0
(F (t)−G(t))dt,
implying that fˆ − g is convex, which completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1: Main existence result
First, observe that a proper scoring rule φ is robust if and only if φ+K is strictly concave. Indeed,
for arbitrary pi ∈ Πˆ(µ) and µ ∈ [0, 1],
Vφ(pi) = 〈φ, pi〉 − φ(µ)−K(µ) + 〈K, pi〉
= 〈φ+K, pi〉 − (φ+K)(µ),
with the first equation following from Lemma 1 and the definition of Vφ. Now for arbitrary γ ∈ R
and λ ∈ (0, 1), define the strictly convex function f := γ− λK (see Equation (6)). Then, by Lemma
2, there exists some strictly convex and subdifferentiable function g, such that f − g is convex. Set
φ := g. By strict convexity and subdifferentiability of g, it follows that φ is a proper scoring rule.
Finally, notice that g + K is strictly concave, as it is the sum of a strictly concave function (viz.,
K + f) and a concave function (viz., g − f). Therefore, by our first argument, φ is robust.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1: Entropic costs
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that φβ is robust if and only if ψβ := φβ +κH is strictly concave.
Observe that ψ′′β(µ) = 2β − κµ(1−µ) , implying that ψ′′β(µ) ≤ 0 if and only if 2βµ2− 2βµ+ κ ≥ 0. Take
∆ := 4β2 − 8βκ and observe that there are three possible cases. If ∆ < 0 then v′′(µ) < 0 for all
µ ∈ [0, 1]. If ∆ = 0 then ψ′′β(µ) ≤ 0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1] with equality holding only for µ = 1/2. Finally,
if ∆ > 0 then v′′(µ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1] ∩ (1
2
−
√
∆
4β
, 1
2
+
√
∆
4β
). Hence, v is strictly concave in [0, 1] if
and only if ∆ ≤ 0, which is the case if and only if β ≤ 2κ.
B. Proofs of Section 4
B.1. Proof of Proposition 2: Quadratic scoring rules
Since K is a strictly concave polynomial of degree n, the (negative) second derivative has k ≤ n− 2
roots. Obviously, if K ′′ has no root then by continuity, max{K ′′(µ)|µ ∈ [0, 1]} < 0, implying that
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there exists some β > 0 such that K +φβ is strictly concave, and therefore φβ is robust. So let focus
on the case where K ′′ has at least one root. Fix an arbitrary ε > 0.
Step 1: Since K ′′ ≤ 0, the roots of K ′′ are also its maxima, viz., arg maxµ∈[0,1]K ′′(µ) = {µ1, . . . , µk}.
Hence, there exists some δˆ > 0 such that K ′′ is strictly increasing in [µˆ1j , µj] and strictly decreasing
in [µj, µˆ
2
j ] for every µj, where µˆ
1
j := max{µj − δˆ, 0} and µˆ2j := min{µj + δˆ, 1}. Then, define βˆ :=
max{K ′′(µˆ`j)|j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and ` ∈ {1, 2}}. Then, by continuity, for each β ∈ (0, βˆ) and each µj,
there are unique µβ,1j ∈ (µˆ1j , µj) and µβ,2j ∈ (µj, µˆ2j) such that K ′′(µβ,1j ) + β = K ′′(µβ,2j ) + β = 0.
Henceforth denote the corresponding interval by Iβj := [µ
β,1
j , µ
β,2
j ], and observe that K
′′(µ) + β ≥ 0
for all µ ∈ Iβj , with strict inequality holding if and only if µ ∈ int(Iβj ).
Step 2: Obviously µβ,`j converges continuously to 0 as β → 0. Hence, there exists some β∗ > 0 such
that for all β ∈ (0, β∗) it is the case that K ′′(µ) < β for all µ /∈ Iβ := Iβ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Iβk . Hence for all
β ∈ (0, β∗), the function ψβ := K + φβ is strictly convex in every Iβj and strictly concave in every
convex subset of clos([0, 1] \ Iβ). Now take the concave closure ψβ(µ) := sup{〈ψβ, pi〉|pi ∈ Π(µ)} of
ψβ (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Notice that by construction ψβ is linear in a closed interval
Jβj := [ν
β,1
j , ν
β,2
j ] ⊇ Iβj for each Iβj , and strictly concave in every convex subset of clos([0, 1] \ Iβ).
Step 3: Now for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and every ` ∈ {1, 2}, we prove that νβ,`j converges monotonically
to µj as β → 0. Without loss of generality, we prove the previous claim for ` = 1. Suppose that this
is not the case. Then, there exists some ν1j ∈ (µˆ1j , µj) such that νβ,1j < ν1j for all β ∈ (0, β∗). Then,
for every λ ∈ (0, 1) it is the case that ψβ(λν1j + (1 − λ)µj) = λψβ(ν1j ) + (1 − λ)ψβ(µj). Moreover,
observe that ψβ(µ)→ K(µ) + α as β → 0 for every µ ∈ [0, 1], implying that
K(λν1j + (1− λ)µj) = lim
β→0
ψβ(λν
1
j + (1− λ)µj)− α
= lim
β→0
(
λψβ(ν
1
j ) + (1− λ)ψβ(µj)
)− α
= λK(ν1j ) + (1− λ)K(µj),
which contradicts the fact that K is strictly concave.
Step 4: By construction, for every β > 0, if µ ∈ Jβj then arg maxpi∈Π(µ) Vφβ(pi) = {pij} where
supp(pij) = {ν1j , ν2j }. On other hand, if µ /∈ Jβ := Jβ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jβk then arg maxpi∈Π(µ) Vφβ(pi) = {µˆ}.
By the previous step, there exists some β ∈ (0, β∗) such that νβ,2j − νβ,1j ≤ ε for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Hence, ν ∈ Bε(µ), for all ν ∈ supp(pi) with pi ∈ arg maxρ∈Π(µ) Vφβ(ρ). Therefore, φβ is ε-robust.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 3: Discrete scoring rules
Take the collection (φk)
n
k=0 of linear functions φk(µ) := ck + dkµ, and define the discrete scoring rule
S : R× Ω→ R by Srk(ω0) := φk(1) and Srk(ω1) := φk(0) for each rk ∈ R. Let us first construct the
φk’s in a way such that S is a (1/n)-robust discrete scoring rule. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} define
µk :=
2k − 1
2n
, (B.1)
subsequently observing that µk = (rk−1+rk)/2. Then, for every µk, consider arbitrary µ1k ∈ (rk−1, µk)
and µ2k ∈ (µk, rk) such that µ2k − µ1k = δ < 1/2n for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By strict concavity of
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K, we obtain K ′−(µ
1
k) > K
′
+(µ
2
k) > K
′
−(µ
1
k+1) > K
′
+(µ
2
k+1). Then, we inductively define (ck, dk) as
follows: Fix arbitrary c0 ∈ R and d0 ∈ R, and given (ck, dk) define
dk+1 := dk +K
′
+(µ
2
k+1)−K ′−(µ1k+1), (B.2)
ck+1 := ck + (dk − dk+1)µk+1, (B.3)
for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. Note that by construction, φk−1(µk) = φk(µk) for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Approximate properness. Let us prove that φ := max{φ1, . . . , φn} is (1/2n)-proper. Notice
that φk(µ) ≥ φ`(µ) for all ` ∈ {0, . . . , n} if and only if µ ∈ [rk−1, rk], with equality holding if and
only if µ ∈ {rk−1, rk}. The latter follows from the fact that (i) dk is strictly increasing in k, and (ii)
φk−1(µk) = φk(µk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, φ is piecewise linear and convex with a kink at every
µ ∈ {µ1, . . . , µn}. Hence, Eµ(Srk) > Eµ(Sr) for every µ ∈ (µk, µk+1) and every r ∈ R\{rk}. Moreover,
Eµk(Srk−1) = Eµk(Srk) > Eµk(Sr) and every r ∈ R \ {rk−1, rk}. Therefore, φ is (1/2n)-proper.
Approximate robustness. Take the function ψ := K+φ, and consider its concave closure ψ(µ) :=
sup{〈ψ, pi〉|pi ∈ Π(µ)} (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). By construction, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
ψ
′
+(µ
1
k) = K
′
+(µ
1
k) + dk−1
= K ′−(µ
2
k) + dk
= ψ
′
−(µ
2
k),
implying that ψ is linear in each interval [µ1k, µ
2
k], and it is strictly concave in every convex subset of
[0, 1] \M , where M := (µ11, µ21) ∪ · · · ∪ (µ1n, µ2n). Hence, we consider two cases:
(i) µ ∈ (µ1k, µ2k) : the subject’s optimal attention strategy is pik ∈ Π(µ) such that supp(pik) =
{µ1k, µ2k}. Hence, by the previous step, upon forming the posterior µ1k the subject will report
rk−1, whereas upon forming the posterior µ2k he will report rk.
(ii) µ ∈ [0, 1] \ M : the subject’s optimal attention strategy is µˆ. Since, by construction µ ∈
[µ2k, µ
1
k+1], again by the previous step, the subject will report rk.
Therefore, we conclude that φ is (1/n)-robust, thus completing the proof.
C. Proofs of Section 5
C.1. Intermediate results
We begin by showing that our (ε, δ)-robustness is well-defined. In particular, the following result
guarantees that for every convex and continuous φ : [0, 1]→ R and every ε ≥ 0, the event {K ∈ C :
εKφ ≤ ε} is measurable in the Borel σ-algebra generated by the topology of the sup norm.
Lemma C1. For every weakly proper scoring rule φ, the function εφ is upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary scoring rule φ, and take an arbitrary sequence (Kt)
∞
t=1 in K converging to
some K0 ∈ K in the topology induced by the sup norm.
Step 1: By Kt −K0 = ψt − ψ0, we obtain ψt → ψ0, where as usual ψt := φ+Kt. That is, for every
δ > 0 there exists some tδ ∈ N such that ‖ψt−ψ0‖∞ := supµ∈[0,1] |ψt(µ)−ψ0(µ)| < δ for every t > tδ.
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Now, for every t ∈ N, take the concave closure ψt(µ) := suppi∈Π(µ)〈ψt, pi〉, and observe that
|ψt(µ)− ψ0(µ)| =
∣∣∣ sup
pi∈Π(µ)
〈ψt, pi〉 − sup
pi∈Π(µ)
〈ψ0, pi〉
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ sup
pi∈Π(µ)
〈ψt − ψ0, pi〉
∣∣∣
≤ sup
pi∈Π(µ)
|〈ψt − ψ0, pi〉|
≤ sup
pi∈Π(µ)
〈|ψt − ψ0|, pi〉.
Then, by the definition of the sup norm, we obtain
‖ψt − ψ0‖∞ ≤ sup
µ∈[0,1]
sup
pi∈Π(µ)
〈|ψt − ψ0|, pi〉
≤ sup
µ∈[0,1]
|ψt − ψ0|
= ‖ψt − ψ0‖∞,
implying that ψt → ψ0.
Step 2: Fix an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1). For each t ∈ N, define the largest closed interval [at, bt]
containing µ, such that ψt is linear in [at, bt]. Moreover, for each ν ∈ [0, 1] define the largest closed
interval Iφ(ν) := [aφ(ν), bφ(ν)] containing ν such that φ is linear in Iφ(ν). Obviously, when the
subject’s posterior belief is ν, every report in [aφ(ν), bφ(ν)] yields the same expected utility φ(ν).
Notice that both aφ and bφ are decreasing in ν. Then, we define a
∗
t := aφ(at) and b
∗
t := bφ(bt),
i.e., the interval [a∗t , b
∗
t ] is the smallest closed interval that contains all the posteriors that can be
optimally reported by the subject when his prior is µ. In other words, a∗t and b
∗
t are the worst-case
scenarios, in terms of distance from µ.
We will now show that
a∗0 ≤ lim inf a∗t ≤ lim sup b∗t ≤ b∗0. (C.1)
For every t ∈ N, the (most dispersed) optimal attention strategy at µ is denoted by pit ∈ Π(µ) and
is distributed over {at, bt}. Hence, we obtain ψt(µ) = 〈ψt, pit〉,10 and therefore, by Step 1,
〈ψt, pit〉 → 〈ψ0, pi0〉. (C.2)
Now suppose – contrary to what we want to show – that lim inf a∗t < a
∗
0 or lim sup b
∗
t > b
∗
0. Since
infk≥t a∗k is increasing and supk≥t b
∗
k is decreasing in k, there exists a subsequence of (a
∗
t , b
∗
t ), identified
by a countable subset T ⊆ N, such that for each t ∈ T it is the case that a∗t < a∗0− δ∗ or b∗t > b∗0 + δ∗,
for some δ∗ > 0. The latter implies that Iφ(at)∩ Iφ(a0) = ∅ and Iφ(bt)∩ Iφ(b0) = ∅ for all t ∈ T . Let
us now consider two cases:
(i) a0 > a
∗
0, i.e., a0 is in the interior or at the upper bound of Iφ(a0): Then, there is some δa > 0
such that at < a0 − δa. Likewise, if b0 < b∗0, there exists δb > 0 such that bt > b0 + δb.
10Here we implicitly assume that 〈ψt, ρ〉 achieves a maximum in Π(ρ), which in turn is true when ψt is continuous.
Assuming the latter is without loss of generality, because we can simply focus on continuousK’s. Indeed, discontinuities
of K can only occur at the boundary of [0, 1], yielding a lower semi-continuous K. Still, such a cost would dominate
the continuous extension of K from the interior (0, 1) to the entire unit interval [0, 1]. Hence, if a scoring rule is robust
(resp., approximately robust) under the continuous cost function, it will also be robust (resp., approximately robust)
under the original discontinuous cost function.
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(ii) a0 = a
∗
0, i.e., a0 is at the lower bound of Iφ(a0): Then, there exists a neighborhood Bδa(a0) such
that φ is strictly convex in the left part of the neighborhood, viz., in {ν ∈ Bδa(a0) : ν ≤ a0};
otherwise, a∗0 < a0 and we are back to the previous case. Hence, at < a0 − δa. Likewise, if
b0 = b
∗
0, there is some δb > 0 such that bt > b0 + δb.
In either case, there exists some strictly positive δ < min{δa, δb} such that at < a0− δ or bt > b0 + δ.
Now, define the attention strategy pi ∈ Π(µ) with supp(pi) = {a0 − δ, b0 + δ}, and observe that
〈ψ0, pi〉 < 〈ψ0, pi0〉, while 〈ψt, pi〉 = 〈ψt, pit〉 for all t ∈ T . Since, 〈ψt, pi〉 → 〈ψ0, pi〉, the latter obviously
contradicts (C.2), thus proving (C.1).
Step 3: Define first d∗t (µ) := b
∗
t − a∗t , and subsequently εt := supµ∈[0,1] d∗t (µ). Then, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that εt = ε
Kt
φ . Then, by Step 2,
d∗0(µ) = b
∗
0 − a∗0
≥ lim sup b∗t − lim inf a∗t
≥ lim sup(b∗t − a∗t )
= lim sup d∗t (µ).
Therefore, it follows directly that lim sup εt ≤ ε0, which completes the proof.
C.2. Proof of Theorem 2: Cost uncertainty
Step 1: Fix an arbitrary ε > 0 and take some n ∈ N such that 1/n ≤ ε/2. Similarly to our earlier
proof (of Proposition 3), we define rk := k/n for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
For an arbitrary γ > 0, define the linear function φγk(µ) := c
γ
k + d
γ
kµ for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where
cγk := −k(k−1)2n γ and dγk := kγ. Then, consider the piecewise linear function φγ := max{φγ1 , . . . , φγn},
observing that it is (weakly) convex, and it has a kink at every µ ∈ {r1, . . . , rn−1}. The latter holds,
because φγk(rk) = φ
γ
k+1(rk).
Fix an arbitrary K ∈ K, and define µk := (rk+rk−1)/2 for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Lk(µ) := ak+bkµ
be an arbitrary tangent of K at µk. By strict concavity of K, we obtain Lk(µ) ≥ K(µ), with equality
holding only at µ = µk.
Step 2: We will prove that there exists some γK > 0 such that Lk(µ) + φ
γ
k(µ) ≥ ψγ(µ), for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all γ < γK , and for all µ ∈ [0, 1] with equality holding only at µ = µk, where as
usual ψγ := φγ + K. Let µ ∈ [r`−1, r`]. If ` = k, then ψγ(µ) = φγk(µ) + K(µ), and our claim follows
directly from Lk being a tangent of K at µk. Hence, we let ` 6= k, letting without loss of generality
` > k (the proof is analogous for ` < k). Hence, it is the case that µ ≥ rk > µk, and therefore
Lk(µ)−K(µ) ≥ Lk(rk)−K(rk) > 0,
noticing that Lk(rk)−K(rk) does not depend either on γ or on µ. Moreover, by construction,
0 ≤ φγ` (µ)− φγk(µ)
< φγ` (1)− φγk(1)
≤ Dkγ,
where Dk := max{(`− k)(2n+ 1− `− k)|` ∈ {k+ 1, . . . , n}}/2n > 0. Note that Dk does not depend
on µ. Hence, we have
Lk(µ) + φ
γ
k(µ)− ψ(µ) = Lk(µ) + φγk(µ)−K(µ)− φγ` (µ)
>
(
Lk(rk)−K(rk)
)−Dkγ.
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Hence, by continuity, there exists some γK > 0 such that (Lk(rk)−K(rk))−Dkγ > 0 for all γ < γK ,
as claimed above.
Step 3: Take γ < γK . Then, by Step 2, we obtain ψ
γ
(µk) = ψ
γ(µk), implying that the optimal
attention strategy at µk is µˆk. Now consider some µ ∈ (µk, µk+1), and let pi ∈ Π(µ) be the optimal
attention strategy with the most dispersed posteriors, i.e., supp(pi) = {ν1, ν2} where [ν1, ν2] is the
largest interval of µ where ψ
γ
is linear. Hence, λψγ(ν1) + (1 − λ)ψγ(ν2) ≥ ψγ(λν1 + (1 − λ)ν2) for
every λ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, in order not to contradict Step 2, it must necessarily be the case that
[ν1, ν2] ⊆ [µk, µk+1]. Similarly, if µ ∈ [0, µ1) every optimal attention strategy yields posteriors in
[0, µ1], and likewise if µ ∈ (µn, 1] every optimal attention strategy yields posteriors in [µn, 1]. Finally,
if the posterior is µ = rk then any report in report [rk−1, rk+1] is optimal, whereas if the posterior is
µ ∈ (rk, rk+1) then every report in [rk, rk+1] is optimal. Therefore, φγ is ε-robust given the cost K.
Step 4: Take a strictly decreasing sequence (γt)
∞
t=1 such that γt ↓ 0. Then, for every K ∈ K, define
TK := min{t ∈ N : φγt is ε-robust given K}. Now, for each t ∈ N define
Kt := {K ∈ K : TK ≤ t}, (C.3)
trivially noticing that Kt ⊆ Kt+1. Moreover, since TK exists for every K ∈ K (by Step 3), it is
obviously the case that Kt ↑ K. Therefore, by Billingsley (1995, Thm 2.1), we obtain P (Kt) ↑ p,
implying that for every δ > 1− p there is some tδ ∈ N such that P (Kt) ≥ 1− δ for all t ≥ tδ.
Step 5: For every t ∈ N, define the event
Et := {K ∈ C : εKφγt ≤ ε}, (C.4)
noticing Kt = Et ∩ K. Indeed, for every t ∈ N and K ∈ K,
K ∈ Kt ⇔ φγt is ε-robust given K
⇔ εKφγt ≤ ε
⇔ K ∈ Et,
thus implying (by Step 4) that for every δ > 1 − p there is some φ ∈ {φγ1 , φγ2 , . . . } such that
P ({K ∈ C : εKφ ≤ ε}) ≥ 1− δ, thus completing the proof.
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